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CHAPTER 15 
Labor Relations 
LAWRENCE M. KEARNS 
A. FEDERAL-STATE JURISDICTION 
§15.1. Pre-emption: Litigating elucidation. "The statutory im-
plications concerning what has been taken from the States [by the Taft-
Hartley Act] and what has been left to them are of a Delphic nature to 
be translated into concreteness by the process of litigating elucidation." 
These words of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Association of Machinists v. 
Gonzales! are indicative of the continuing development of the pre-
emption doctrine in the field of labor relations law. In a colorful 
opinion,2 the majority in Gonzales upheld the jurisdiction of a state 
court to entertain a breach of contract action by a union member for 
wrongful expulsion from a union and to award damages for the mem-
ber's consequent loss of wages and mental suffering, even though the 
union's conduct might be the basis for an unfair labor practice under 
the Taft-Hartley Act. The potential conflict with federal policy was 
held to be too contingent and too remotely related to the public in-
terest expressed in Taft-Hartley, to justify depriving state courts of 
jurisdiction to vindicate the personal rights of an ousted union mem-
ber. The state court was held not to lack jurisdiction to "fill out" 
its remedy of reinstatement in the union (admittedly not displaced 
by Taft-Hartley) by an award of damages for loss of wages (which 
the NLRB could order) and mental and physical suffering (which the 
NLRB could not award). The possibility of partial relief from 
the NLRB does not, in such a case, deprive a party of available state 
remedies for all damages suffered. There was a vigorous, lengthy and 
equally colorful dissent by the Chief Justice, in which Mr. Justice 
Douglas joined. 
LAWRENCE M. KEARNS is a partner in the firm of Morgan, Brown and Kearns, 
Boston. He is co-author (with Donald A. Shaw) of Labor Relations Guide for 
Massachusetts (1950, Supp. 1957). 
The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Louis M. Bernstein, a mem-
ber of the Student Board of the ANNUAL SURVEY. 
§15.1. ! 356 U.S. 617,78 Sup. Ct. 923, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1018 (1958). 
2 Mr. Justice Frankfurter refers to a contrary result as possibly being "abstractly 
justifiable as a matter of wooden logic." He also quotes approvingly from an article 
by a prominent union attorney to the effect that state court actions of this type do 
not present "potentialities of conflicts in kind or degree which require a hands-off 
direction to the states." Isaacson, Labor Relations Law, Federal Versus State Juris-
diction, 42 A.B.A.J. 415, 483 (1956). 
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In another case decided the same day, United Automobile Workers 
v. Russell} the Court also held that the federal pre-emption doctrine 
did not apply, again with a vigorous dissent by the Chief Justice. 
Here a non-striking employee had brought an action for damages 
against the union in an Alabama state court for maliciously prevent-
ing him from engaging in his employment by means of unlawful 
picketing during an economic strike. The union had engaged in mass 
picketing and when the non-striking employee attempted to drive to-
ward the plant gates in his car, the pickets blocked the way and 
threatened him with bodily harm and damage to his property. He re-
covered $10,000 in compensatory and punitive damages.4 
The majority opinion held that, even assuming the conduct of the 
union to be an unfair labor practice under Section 8(b)(I)(A) of the 
Taft-Hartley Act, the state court had jurisdiction. It relied on the 
Laburnum case5 in which a state court was held to have jurisdiction in 
a tort action for damages by an employer against a union for loss of 
business caused by the union's unlawful conduct. Under the facts in 
Laburnum the NLRB could not have awarded the employer damages 
but would have been limited to a cease and desist order. In Russell it 
was assumed that the NLRB could have awarded the employee back 
pay (compensatory damages) but could not have granted punitive dam-
ages. The possibility of such partial NLRB relief was held not to de-
prive the employee of his common law right of action for all damages 
suffered.6 It was also pointed out that there was no conflict of reme-
dies of a kind forbidden by the pre-emption doctrine. The majority 
declared that the Court's concern has been that "one forum would en-
join, as illegal, conduct which the other forum would find legal, or 
that the state courts would restrict the exercise of rights guaranteed by 
the Federal Acts." Here, however, there is no inconsistency if one 
forum awarded back pay and the other did not. Further, to cut off the 
employee's common law rights of action against a union tort-feasor 
"would in effect, grant to unions a substantial immunity from the 
consequences of mass picketing or coercion such as was employed dur-
ing the strike in the present case." 7 
3356 U.S. 634,78 Sup. Ct. 932, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1030 (1958). 
4 It is noted in the dissenting opinion that 29 other employees had suits against 
the union for the same conduct pending in the state court, and the damages claimed 
totaled $1,500,000. 
5 United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 
74 Sup. Ct. 833, 98 L. Ed. 1025 (1954), discussed in 1954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §16.2. 
6 The dissenting opinion argued that the majority decision will result in viola-
tions of the federal act varying as to their consequences from state to state, depend-
ing upon the availability of a given right of action and procedures, citing as ex-
:>mples Massachusetts and four other states that do not permit punitive damages 
under these circumstances. The dissent cites McCormick, Damages §78 (1935), and 
Note, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 517 (1957), as authority for this statement of Massachusetts 
law. 
7 By way of dicta, the majority opinion indicates that the union's conduct was 
such that the pre·emption doctrine did not protect it against equitable relief by state 
courts. " ... [W]e note that the union's activity in this case clearly was not pro-
2
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In Youngdahl v. RainfairJ Inc.8 the United States Supreme Court 
held: (1) a state court may enjoin strikers and union representatives 
from threatening, intimidating or coercing any of the officers, agents, 
or employees of the employer at any place and also from obstructing or 
attempting to obstruct the free use of the streets adjacent to the em-
ployer's place of business and the free ingress and egress to and from 
the employer's property; and (2) a state court may not enjoin peaceful 
picketing. The employer was engaged in interstate commerce. The 
conduct of the pickets principally complained of was abusive language, 
such as "scab," 9 shouted sufficiently loudly and by such a large number 
of pickets as to justify the Arkansas trial court in a finding that vio-
lence was imminent. But the trial court was held to have "entered the 
pre-empted domain of the National Labor Relations Board in so far as 
it enjoined peaceful picketing." The Court pointed out that there was 
nothing in the record to indicate that here, as distinguished from the 
J.,!eadowmoor case,lO the picketing was so enmeshed with violence that 
en]t\ining of peaceful picketing would be required to make effective an 
injunction against the conduct calculated to provoke violence. 
In a per curiam decision the United States Supreme Court reversed 
the Supreme Court of Ohio which had upheld an injunction against 
peaceful picketing for recognition as bargaining agent by a union that 
had lost an NLRB election.11 
Another facet of federal-state jurisdiction was involved in Staub v. 
City of Baxleyp dealing with the validity of a municipal ordinance 
making it an offense to solicit members for any dues-collecting organi-
zation without a permit. The union organizer who was convicted 
raised inter alia the contention that the ordinance was in conflict with 
the National Labor Relations Act, but the Supreme Court did not 
reach this issue, since the ordinance was held unconstitutional on its 
face as an abridgement of freedom of speech. 
tee ted by federal law. Indeed, the strike was conducted in such a manner that it 
could have been enjoined by Alabama courts." The Court cited the Youngdahl case, 
discussed in the text supported by notes 8·10 intra, and Auto Workers v. Wisconsin 
Board, 351 U.S. 266, 76 Sup. Ct. 794, 100 L. Ed. 1162 (1956). It may be argued that 
there is an inference that the unlawful conduct in the Russell case was deemed so 
interwoven with other conduct that the strike itself (including peaceful picketing) 
could have been enjoined. 
8355 U.S. 131, 78 Sup. Ct. 206, 2 L. Ed. 2d 151 (1957). 
9 Among the many varieties of adjectival modifications used was the apparently 
modern "cotton-picking scab." 
10 Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 61 Sup. 
Ct. 552, 85 L. Ed. 836, 132 A.L.R. 1200 (1941). See also comment in note 7 supra as 
to the dicta in the more recent Russell case. 
11 District Lodge 34, Lodge 804, International Assn. of Machinists v. L. P. Cavett 
Co., 355 U.S. 39, 78 Sup. Ct. 122, 2 L. Ed. 2d 72 (1957). The NLRB has held that 
picketing under these circumstances violates Section 8(b)(I)(A) of the National 
Labor Relations Act, as amended. Local 639, Teamsters and Curtis Bros., Inc., 119 
N.L.R.B. No. 33 (Oct. 30, 1957), but the Board's decision was overturned by the 
Court of Appeals. Local 639, Teamsters v. NLRB, 43 L.R.R.M. 2156 (D.C. Cir. 
1958). 
12355 U.S. 313, 78 Sup. Ct. 277, 2 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1958). 
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No federal legislation on labor law jurisdiction was enacted during 
the past year, although the Senate passed a bill 18 which contained an 
amendment to Section IO(a) of the National Labor Relations Act 
requiring the NLRB to assert jurisdiction in all cases, thus eliminating 
the "twilight zone" created by the Guss case;14 the amendment, how-
ever, failed to pass in the House, partly, at least, because of those who 
favored allowing the states to act when the board has declined jurisdic-
tion. But Congress did increase the board's appropriations in response 
to the board's claim that it required more money before it would be 
able to lower its requirements for exercising jurisdiction. 
B. MASSACHUSETI'S DECISIONS 
§15.2. Injunctions in labor disputes. In Poirier v. Superior Court,1 
the union (in the building trades) began picketing an unorganized em-
ployer (a construction company) with signs stating that the employer 
was "Non Union," and setting forth the name of the union. The 
agreed facts were that the picketing was peaceful, none of the pickets 
was ever in the employ of the employer, and none of the employees was 
a member of any union. The employer brought a bill in equity al-
leging inter alia that the pickets' purpose was to compel the employer 
to sign a union agreement with the union involved. In the Superior 
Court, a preliminary injunction against the picketing was granted 
without the filing of a bond by the employer and withQut the findings 
of the judge required by the statute in cases involving a labor dispute. 
The judge found that there was no labor dispute. On the union's pe-
tition for writ of mandamus the Supreme Judicial Court reversed the 
order of the Superior Court granting the preliminary injunction, hold-
ing that a labor dispute existed and, consequently, that the preliminary 
injunction issued without jurisdiction' since the procedural require-
ments o( the statute applicable in labor dispute cases had not been 
followed.2 
The statute defines labor disputes as including: 
18 Senate No. 3974. 
14 See comments on the Cuss case and the problems it raises in 1957 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §25.1. 
§15.2. 11958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 797, 150 N.E.2d 558. The pendency of this case be-
fore the Supreme Judicial Court was noted in 1957 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §25.2. 
2 These procedural requirements, set forth in C.L., c. 214, §9A, include: (1) a 
hearing on notice (subject to special, detailed provisions applicable to applications 
for temporary restraining orders); (2) findings of fact by the court in respect to the 
commission or continuation of unlawful acts, substantial and irreparable injury, 
greater injury to the complainant by denial of relief than to the defendants by 
granting relief, inadequacy of remedy at law, and inability or unwillingness of police 
to furnish protection; (!\) the furnishing of a bond by the complainant; and (4) a 
requirement that the complainant must have complied with all legal obligations in-
volved in the labor dispute and must have made every reasonable effort to settle 
such dispute either by negotiation, mediation or arbitration. 
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any controversy arising out of any demand of any character what-
soever concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concern-
ing the association or representation of persons in negotiating, 
fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange, terms or 
conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants 
stand in proximate relation of employer and employee.3 
The italicized phrases above-quoted were added to the previous statu-
tory provision by the Cox-Phillips Act of 1950.4 Pointing to the allega-
tion in the employer's bill in equity that the union's purpose was to 
compel the employer to sign a union agreement, the Court concluded 
that there was a labor dispute between the parties. What constitutes a 
labor dispute under the statutory definition of Section 20C is a question 
of law. The case involved persons "in the same industry, trade, craft 
" or occupation," the dispute was "between one or more employers ... 
'-Md one or more employees or association of employees" and "conflict-
ing or competing interests in a 'labor dispute' of persons participating 
or interested therein," all of which are involved in the statutory defi-
nition of an equity case involving or growing out of a labor dispute. 
The Court pointed out that the fact that there are no business relations 
between the employer and the union is no longer important because of 
the addition of the statutory language, "regardless of whether the dis-
putants stand in proximate relation of employer and employee." 5 
The decision, which would appear to be a correct interpretation of 
the statute, is confined to the procedural aspects of injunction proceed-
ings in cases involving labor disputes. The opinion states, "The effect 
of the [statutory] definitions ... is to make the procedural safeguards 
of c. 214, §9A applicable to every kind of labor dispute regardless of 
whether the dispute is lawful or unlawful as a matter of substantive 
law." 6 The Court was not called upon to rule on whether the labor 
dispute was lawful 7 and judiciously refrained from making any com-
ment in this respect. This substantive question involves the contro-
versial issue of organizational picketing, the legal status of which is still 
in doubt in Massachusetts.s 
3 G.L., c. 149, §20C, as amended by Acts of 1950, c. 452, §2. (Emphasis supplied.) 
4 Acts of 1950, c. 452. 
5 Thus laying to rest the statements in Simon v. Schwachman, 301 Mass. 573, 18 
N.E.2d I (1938), and Quinton'S Market, Inc. v. Patterson, 303 Mass. 315, 21 N.E.2d 
546 (1939), decided prior to the Cox-Phillips Act, to the effect that no labor dispute 
existed if the pickets were not employees of the picketed employer, or the picketing 
union had no members employed by the picketed employer. 
61958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 797, 801, 150 N.E.2d 558, 561. 
7 Subsection (d) of G.L., c. 149, §20C defines "lawful labor disputes"; Subsection 
(e) defines "unlawful labor disputes"; and Subsection (f) defines "unlawful secondary 
boycotts." 
S At a trial on the merits in a case like the Poirier case, the union would un-
doubtedly deny the allegation that the purpose of the pickets was to compel the em-
ployer to sign a union agreement. The union's usual position in such instances is 
that the picketing is not "recognition" picketing directed against the employer to 
have the latter recognize the union as collective bargaining agent, but, rather, that 
it is either "informational," i.e., informing the general public that the employer is 
5
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§15.3. Employment security: Compulsory retirement. In Lamont 
v. Director of the Division of Employment Securityl the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court held that employees who leave their employment under a 
compulsory retirement provision of a pension plan agreed to by a 
union that is the employees' bargaining agent, and the employer, are 
disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits under the Employ-
ment Security Law2 on the basis of leaving work "without good cause 
attributable to the employing unit or its agent." The Court's reason-
ing was that the claimant for benefits "was bound by the agreement 
made on his behalf by the union to the same extent as though he had 
entered into it individually." The compulsory retirement feature of 
the agreed-upon pension plan under which the employee was required 
to leave his employment upon reaching a specified age was the cause 
of his leaving, and, in the words of the Court, this is "a cause jointly 
attributable to both the employing unit and the union, that is, to 
both the employing unit and the employees." 
Prior to this decision, the rule followed by the Division of EI))ploy-
ment Security was to allow unemployment benefits to employees retired 
under a compulsory retirement plan, if otherwise qualified, and to 
deny benefits to those whose retirement was voluntary. Following this 
decision, a bill was promptly filed in the General Court which would 
permit employees retired under a compulsory retirement provision of 
a pension plan to receive benefits if otherwise qualified, regardless of 
whether prior assent to compulsory retirement had been given by the 
employee either directly or indirectly. This bill would also change the 
language in the disqualification for leaving work from leaving "with-
out good cause attributable to the employing unit" to "without good 
non-union, or "peaceful persuasion" directed toward the unorganized employees in 
an effort to induce them to join the union. The term "organizational" picketing is 
a general term often used to refer to all such picketing. Employers counter the 
union arguments with the contention that the union's actual purpose is to bring 
economic pressure on the employer through respect for the picket line by those mak-
ing deliveries or picking up shipments, and the only way the employer can stop the 
picketing is to commit the unfair labor practice of recognizing the union which does 
not represent a majority of the employees. The interesting question is also raised 
whether any "demand" is being made if the picketing is merely informational, a 
"demand" being one of the statutory ingredients of a labor dispute. A related 
question is whether an employer may obtain an election by the Massachusetts Labor 
Relations Commission on the basis of organizational picketing. The commission 
will not order an election in the absence of a request for recognition by the union 
involved. Recent articles on organizational picketing can be found in Bomstein, 
Organizational Picketing in American Law, 46 Ky. L.J. 25 (1957); Gochman, Organi-
zational Picketing in New York, 9 Lab. L.J. 143 (1958); Meltzer, Recognition - Or-
ganizational Picketing and Right to Work Laws, 9 Lab. L.J. 55 (1958); Stern, En-
joinable Organizational Picketing: A Phantasy on the Constitutional Doctrine of 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Vogt, 31 Temp. L.Q. 12 (1957); Notes, 
26 Fordham L. Rev. 580 (1957); 9 Syracuse L. Rev. 134 (1957); 11 Vand. L. Rev. 627 
(1958). 
§15.3. 1 1958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 593, 149 N.E.2d 372. 
2 G.L., c. 151A. 
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cause." This bill has been enacted since the close of the 1958 SURVEY 
year.3 
C. MASSACHUSETTS LEGISLATION 
§15.4. Public employees: Right to form unions. During the 1958 
SURVEY year the General Court enacted a statute recognizing the right 
of public employees to form and join labor organizations and to pre-
sent proposals relative to their salaries and conditions of employment.1 
This is the first specific statutory provision in Massachusetts history 
relating to this subject. Public employees are specifically excluded 
from the Massachusetts Labor Relations Act 2 as well as the National 
Labor Relations Act.3 In recognizing the right of public employees to 
form and join labor organizations and in proscribing discharge, dis-
crimination, intimidation and coercion in connection with the exercise 
G~ this right, the new statute is similar to state and federal labor law 
gO\'L'"ning the rights of non-public employees. The right of public 
employees "to present proposals" is, however, something substantially 
less than the right to bargain collectively provided by law for non-
public employees. This statute also does not specifically treat of "em-
ployer-dominated" labor organizations forbidden by state and federal 
laws in non-public employment. 
The concept of a majority representative of employees being the ex-
clusive bargaining agent for all employees in an appropriate unit is 
not followed. Nor is there any method provided for determining 
whether a particular unit is the "representative of their own choosing." 
Presumably a union would present proposals for its members only, and 
more than one union could have representation in the same group of 
employees. 
An interesting feature of this new law is the prohibition against any 
person using direct or indirect intimidation or coercion to compel or 
attempt to compel a public employee "to join or refrain from joining" 
a union. Although the Taft-Hartley Act recognizes the right of em-
ployees to join or refrain from joining a union, the Massachusetts 
Labor Relations Act recognizes only the employees' right to join a 
union and does not recognize the right of employees to refrain from 
3 Acts of 1958, c. 677. 
§15.4. 1 Acts of 1958, c. 460. The act inserts new Section 178D in G.L., c. 149, as 
follows: "Employees of the commonwealth or any political subdivision thereof shall 
have the right to form and join vocational or labor organizations and to present 
proposals relative to salaries and other conditions of employment through repre· 
sentatives of their own choosing. No such employee shall be discharged or dis· 
criminated against because of his exercise of such right, nor shall any person or 
group of persons, directly or indirectly, by intimidation or coercion, compel or at-
tempt to compel any such employee to join or refrain from joining a vocational or 
a labor organization. This section shall not be applicable to police officers in the 
employ of the commonwealth or any political subdivision thereof." 
2 G.L., c. 150A, §2(2). 
3 NLRA §2(2), 49 Stat. 450 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §152 (1952). 
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